


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SPECIAL REPORT

POLAND BEFORE THE PARTY CONGRESS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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12 June 1964

POLAND BEFORE THE PARTY CONGRESS

Wladyslaw Gomulka will open the fourth congress of his Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) on 15 June faced with a variety of problems, many of his own making. A moderate Communist, a Polish nationalist, and almost puritanical in his personal conservatism, Gomulka has smothered the elan of the October 1956 revolution with pragmatic but colorless middle-of-the-road policies. The results have been dissatisfaction and apathy in the nation as a whole, serious factionalism in the party, and, hanging over-all, the miasma of a ubiquitous and largely ineffective bureaucracy.

Despite the seriousness of the challenges to his leadership and the depth of the party rifts, Gomulka will probably dominate the congress and continue to head the party if only because there is no acceptable replacement. Through a combination of coercion and political compromise, he will continue to grapple with his basic problem: how to improve his control without compromising his centrist policies. He will not, however, be able to end the factionalism which has produced much of the uncertainty and administrative chaos in Poland today.

Gomulka's Rule

Since 1956 the stability of the Polish Communist regime has rested on Gomulka's ability to maintain a balance among the party factions, together with the failure of his divided party critics to produce viable policies as alternatives to his. At the time of the third party congress in March 1959 the economy was slowly but tangibly improving, and Gomulka had achieved a political and ideological modus vivendi with the Soviet Union whereby it was understood he would have autonomy on domestic affairs but would support Moscow in external affairs. The

fourth congress--delayed for over a year beyond statutory requirements--will, however, find the party split and Gomulka under heavy criticism from the party and populace, partly because there has been a slowdown in Poland's economy.

Since 1959, Gomulka's inherent conservatism has increasingly colored his previous stress on pragmatism. Practical responses to problems remain fixed in 1956 terms, and the momentum gained then has dissipated. Gomulka has not exploited even the degree of flexibility inherent in most of his basic

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STABILITY OF POLISH PARTY LEADERSHIP

Figure 1

OCTOBER 1956	AFTER THIRD CONGRESS (March 1959)	BEFORE FOURTH CONGRESS (June 1964)
<p>Cyrankiewicz Gomulka</p> <p>Jedrychowski Morawski</p> <p>Loga-Sowinski Ochab Rapacki</p> <p>Zambrowski Zawadzki</p>	<p>Cyrankiewicz Gomulka Gierek (Co-opted at Third Congress) Jedrychowski Morawski ("Resigned" November 1959) Kliszko (Co-opted at Third Congress) Loga-Sowinski Ochab Rapacki Spychalski (Co-opted at Third Congress) Zambrowski (Removed July 1963) Zawadzki</p>	<p>Cyrankiewicz Gomulka Gierek Jedrychowski</p> <p>Kliszko Loga-Sowinski Ochab Rapacki Spychalski Zawadzki</p>
<p>Gomulka Gierek Jarosinski Albrecht Matwin Ochab</p> <p>Zambrowski</p>	<p>Gomulka Gierek Jarosinski Albrecht (Removed Jan. 1961) Matwin (Removed July 1963)</p> <p>Morawski (Replaced Ochab from May 1957 to Jan. 1960) Kliszko (Co-opted May 1957) Zambrowski (Removed July 1963)</p>	<p>Gomulka Gierek Jarosinski</p> <p>Ochab (Co-opted Jan. 1960) Kliszko</p> <p>Sirzelecki (Co-opted Jan. 1960) Starewicz (Co-opted July 1963) Jaszczuk (Co-opted July 1963)</p>

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policies, and this has resulted in political stagnation, growing bureaucratization, and a loss of faith in the future among Poles generally. Gomulka still has enough support to maintain his position as party leader. However, his middle-of-the-road policies and seeming unwillingness to deal drastically with his party opponents practically ensure that they will be able to continue to obstruct effective government in Poland.

Party Leadership

Poland's party leaders (see Figure 1) are aging. Gomulka's right-hand man, politburo member Zenon Kliszko, already has suffered two heart attacks. Foreign Minister Racki had a serious heart seizure last year and only recently has resumed a full schedule of activities. Chairman of the Council of State Zawadzki, long ill, has undergone abdominal surgery. Despite failing eyesight, agriculture chief Ochab has taken on additional duties since July as a result of the ouster from the politburo of its last remaining Jewish member, Roman Zambrowski.

Pressing against this weakened policy-making layer of the party are many of the generally younger hard-line internal security and intelligence specialists who have been building up their political influence since Gomulka returned them to high positions in 1959.

Gomulka is willing to use these younger men as "technicians," who can improve internal security and strengthen party control. But he does not accept the policies which would logically stem from their tendency to disregard moderation and legality in the process of tightening national discipline. Nor does he regard these men as capable and trustworthy replacements for ailing top party leaders.

This situation is typical of the problems created by Gomulka himself which have decreased the party's effectiveness and confused the bureaucracy.

Factionalism

At odds among themselves on many issues, all party factions (see Figure 2) are, for different reasons, critical of Gomulka's pragmatic conservatism.

The Stalinist Natolinists and the more moderate Pulawians have been the most vocal, but the nationalistic and anti-Semitic Partisans have apparently had most success in gaining Gomulka's confidence. At the other end of the political spectrum are the politically weak advocates of a more relaxed cultural line and of proposals designed to reform Poland's economic system and increase trade with the West.

Because of the steps Gomulka has taken to improve his control over the party and the economy, such as strengthening the internal

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Figure 2

POLISH PARTY FACTIONALISM				
Factions	Name	PARTY FUNCTION	NONPARTY FUNCTION	REMARKS
PRO-GOMULKA moderates	Gomulka	Secretariat	Central Committee Members & Functionaries	
	Cyrankiewicz	First Secretary	CC Member	Member of Gomulka's "old guard"; heads subgroup of former socialists.
	Jedrychowski	Member	CC Member	
	Kliszko	Member	CC Member	
	Loga-Sowinski	Member	CC Member	
	Ochab	Member	CC Member	
	Rapacki	Member	CC Member	
	Spychalski	Member	CC Member	
	Roman Nowak	Member	CC Member	
	Kraso	Member	CC Member	
"PARTISANS" hard-line, nationalist, anti-Semitic	Sirzelecki	Secretary	CC Member	
	Moczar	Secretary	CC Member	
	Korczynski	Secretary	CC Member	
	Duszynski	Secretary	CC Member	
	Witaszewski	Secretary	CC Member	
	Gede *	Secretary	CC Member	
	Kruczek	Secretary	CC Member	
	Zenon Nowak *	Secretary	CC Member	
	Ruminski *	Secretary	CC Member	
	Szyr *	Secretary	CC Member	
"PULAWIANS" moderate, pro-Gomulka, ex-Stalinist	Tokarski *	Secretary	CC Member	
	Wojas	Secretary	CC Member	
	Starewicz	Secretary	CC Member	
	Zambrowski	Secretary	CC Member	
	Schaff	Secretary	CC Member	
	Kasman	Secretary	CC Member	
	Leon Strastak	Secretary	CC Member	
	Gierek	Secretary	CC Member	
	Zawadzki *	Secretary	CC Member	
	Jarosinski	Secretary	CC Member	
OTHERS including independents and revisionists	Jaraczuk	Secretary	CC Member	
	Jarozewicz	Secretary	CC Member	
	Jagielski	Secretary	CC Member	
	Marowski	Secretary	CC Member	
	Malwin	Secretary	CC Member	
	Albrecht	Secretary	CC Member	
		Secretary	CC Member	
		Secretary	CC Member	
		Secretary	CC Member	
		Secretary	CC Member	

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* Nationalist oriented

* Jewish

NOTE: Factional lines are necessarily arbitrary and do not preclude movement between factions.

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security apparatus, increasing censorship, hardening the cultural line, cutting back employment, and tightening labor discipline, many moderates and liberals fear reintroduction of pre-1956 police supremacy. Some have quietly opposed this trend in party circles, but their opposition has not coalesced and merely adds to the factional disarray.

During 1963, anticipating the party congress, Gomulka made a number of unsuccessful efforts to end factional feuding by initiating personnel changes designed to balance the influence of liberal and hard-line elements in party affairs.

During the summer and fall he established a special "preparatory commission" charged with making final arrangements and creating the congress machinery. In this body, representatives of the most vociferous and determined factions are vastly outnumbered by Gomulka's own generation of Communists who represent a variety of points of view but are in basic agreement with him.

In January a group of members of the once-powerful "Natolin" faction, which vigorously opposed Gomulka's return to power in 1956, circulated a lengthy tract which severely criticized Gomulka's policies as having led to "rightist deviation" and a "rebirth of a new bourgeois class" composed of a relatively affluent private peasantry and upper-ech-

elon party leaders. Gomulka was scored for failing to "socialize" agriculture, slowing the rate of industrialization, and "indulging" the Roman Catholic Church. The tract struck out against the "too-liberal" Zambrowski group for its connections with Jews around the world, and against the hard-line "Partisan" group around party secretary Strzelecki which it criticized as "too nationalistic" --i.e., anti-Russian.

The report of a commission which investigated the pamphlet's origins reportedly was the center of discussion at the 15th central committee plenum in March. The Natolin charges reportedly were aired again at the stormy plenum, and countercharges presumably were presented in a speech by Zambrowski. Published elements of Gomulka's opening and closing speeches, pleading for party unity and stressing the need to acquaint the youthful majority of the population with the achievements of Communist Poland, suggested a renewed necessity to "sell" his policies as a basis for unity.

These pleas were ignored by the Zambrowski group, which--probably responding to the Natolinist charges--circulated a lengthy rebuttal of its own within the party in April. It charged that Gomulka's attempts to maintain a balance around his relatively moderate views "are making it easier" for "dogmatic elements" to assert their influence within the regime. This document strikes against both the former Natolinists and Strzelecki's group.

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The last and loosest of the major factional groups, Strzelecki's "Partisans," which wants party control improved in all fields, may gain its first politburo seat by exploiting the precipitous actions of the other two factions and by generally being more subtle in its activities.

Gomulka has threatened to act against both pamphleteering factions, but no forthright move is likely until after the congress. In fact, one recent speech by a politburo member suggests that the threat has served to coerce the factions into maintaining a facade of unity for the period of the congress.

Economic Problems

Rapid industrialization has continued in Poland, and economic performance in most respects has been close to plan. However, agricultural production has fallen since 1961, and some opposition charges, especially that Gomulka's economic policies have short-changed the consumer and the average worker, appear justified.

Per capita consumption has increased slightly, but not enough to keep pace with Gomulka's promises. Much of this increase was made possible by rising employment, which until mid-1963 added to the number of wage earners per family. Average wages have risen slowly since 1959, staying ahead of prices by only a small margin.

The drop in agricultural production not only depressed the supply of food available for domestic consumption last year, but also cut into agricultural exports, causing the regime to retrench heavily on imports of materials for light industry.

The resulting inflation and the government's anti-inflationary measures have caused considerable dissatisfaction among the population. Prices of a number of consumer goods were raised, wages were frozen, and last year a new policy of holding down employment led to widespread layoffs, especially among women and other "second" wage earners within a family. Unemployment reached a postwar peak, playing into the hands of Gomulka's critics. Gomulka has subsequently taken the position that full employment will be the "main economic problem" of the next five-year plan.

Both hard-line and liberal critics are also pointing out that investment costs in the current five-year plan have been consistently underestimated and that a number of projects--especially in community services and consumer goods industries--have had to be canceled. There is also wide concern with a number of other problems in industry, for example, slowness in introducing technological improvements and the production of goods for which there is no market.

These economic problems are likely to continue, although Poland still has the potential for fairly rapid economic growth.

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Despite his critics, Gomulka has ruled out basic changes in economic policies or the economic system for the foreseeable future. The fourth five-year plan (1966-70) directives--very similar to those for the current plan--are likely to be adopted with little change at the party congress.

Although some personnel changes among those responsible for economic policy and administration will probably be made at the congress or soon afterward, this will not end factionalism and is unlikely to bring about a change in the basic line of the plan. Gomulka has been unwilling to heed the advice of his more realistic economic advisers, preferring to endorse the simpler but less effective solutions of party functionaries. Top economic planner Jedrychowski appears to have retained Gomulka's confidence, but the positions of Deputy Premiers Tokarski, Szyr, and Gede--each responsible for a weak sector of the economy--are reportedly less secure.

Gomulka's Position

A major factor in favor of Gomulka's continued party leadership is that the warring factions seem intent on influencing rather than unseating him. With no alternative party leader acceptable to all factions--Gomulka has been able to play off one faction against another and to strengthen his role of final arbiter. This situation has its drawbacks, however, because it means in practice that almost no signifi-

cant decisions can be made except by Gomulka.

Another factor, and one which has been consistently underestimated by Gomulka's party critics, is his personal political skill. He has used it without fanfare not only to parry factional thrusts but also to secure and enlarge his already dominant control over the middle and lower level party apparatus. Several recent personnel reshuffles in the central committee apparatus and in the provincial and district party organizations have been aimed at making them more responsive to Warsaw. Since last fall, and especially since mid-April, Gomulka's closest associates on the politburo have been making separate tours of the provinces apparently to gauge, stimulate, and report on Gomulka's grass-roots party support.

Possibly the most important factor in Gomulka's favor is that the majority of Polish party members are moderates and loyal to him, despite dissatisfaction with various aspects of his policy and administration. They fear that any change in leadership could only be for the worse.

Popular Attitudes

One of the unique features of the post-1956 Gomulka regime--its flexibility in applying different policies to different "interest groups," e.g., intellectuals, church, workers, and

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youth--has disappeared in favor of a more unified and generally harsher policy across the board. Gomulka's personal popularity has greatly diminished as a result. Antiregime demonstrations on economic and religious grounds have increased and the threat of larger scale outbreaks persists. Nevertheless, in the past few months the public mood has been tempered by a realization that there is no feasible alternative to present conditions. Moreover, the regime's augmentation of the security forces and its recent propaganda campaign for public discipline reflect its preparedness, and it is well able to control, if not prevent, any demonstrations of public discontent.

Paradoxically, the main effect of harder domestic policies on the general population has been an increase in the already widespread political apathy and rejection of ideological commitment. This apathy works in favor of the political status quo.

Church and State

Even though about 90 percent of Poland's population is Roman Catholic, this attitude of non-involvement has affected popular responses to increasingly effective, but refined, regime measures designed to destroy the church. Moreover, the regime has become more adroit at handling local church-state frictions and preventing coalescence of public dissatisfaction about efforts to suppress church influence.

Religious observances in nearly all their forms are permitted by the state, and the apathetic populace often tends to agree with the regime line that the church's activities should be restricted to purely religious matters. To a certain extent Cardinal Wyszynski's initial support of Gomulka, and his continued advocacy of civil obedience and citizen participation in the "good works" of the state, have helped to shape popular acceptance of the regime's basically antichurch policy. Furthermore these past and present positions of the primate have tended to blunt the effectiveness of his warnings of grave danger. The cardinal may hope that his recent announcement that the church could not in good conscience participate in this year's celebration of the 20th anniversary of "People's Poland" will jar the apathy of the people. The coincidence of this celebration and of observances in honor of the 1,000th anniversary of Christianity in Poland will provide many occasions for friction in the next year.

Intellectual Unrest

Gomulka dislikes and distrusts intellectuals but is willing to leave them undisturbed if they present no problems. For this reason their recent protests against regime policies appear to be politically most significant.

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The regime has already taken some steps toward resolving confusion caused by an unclear cultural policy and toward easing its embarrassment over a letter sent in March to Premier Cyrankiewicz by 34 leading Polish intellectuals objecting to increasing cultural controls. Recently, propaganda organs have combined attacks against Western publicity about the affair with hints of some relaxation in the cultural policy.

Polish intellectuals are becoming more and more convinced that their protests will ultimately have good effects, and some are speculating that cultural policy will be substantially relaxed after the congress.

Soviet Support

While Khrushchev is scheduled to pay an official visit to Poland on the occasion of its national day, 22 July, he will not attend the party congress. Despite this gesture of noninvolvement in Polish party politics, Khrushchev's recent public endorsements of Gomulka provided the latter with a strong trump card for dealing with his party critics. Khrushchev's speech occurred in mid-April at a time of Polish-Soviet disagreement on proper tactics to be employed in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Since 1960 this issue has repeatedly strained the close personal re-

lationship between the two leaders, without however, seriously affecting it.

Warsaw's support of Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute is tempered by the view--which has internal ramifications in Poland--that China is a sovereign, equal Communist state. Gomulka's consistent efforts to mediate the dispute and prevent formal expulsion of the Chinese party from the international movement are apparently rooted in the fear that a formal Moscow-Peiping split would engender stricter discipline in the remaining Soviet-led camp, and might stimulate a Soviet detente with West Germany.

Outlook

Even though Gomulka may bring one or two of his present critics into policy-making posts, neither the top command nor the regime's basic policies are likely to be altered significantly. The narrow range of alternatives Gomulka is willing to consider in present-day Poland precludes basic policy shifts, regardless of personality changes.

At best Gomulka can only paper over the deep rifts within the party and temporarily reduce the disarray which has resulted from factional maneuvers.

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Probably to the disappointment of party liberals and hard-liners alike, future developments, based on the program and political tone which are likely to be

adopted at the congress, will probably be no more than a continuation of Gomulka's colorless and conservative course. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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